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Abstract  
This paper explores the growth of the ‘new’ private security industry and private policing 
arrangements, policing cyberspace. It argues there has been a significant change in policing 
which is equivalent to the ‘quiet revolution’ associated with private policing that Shearing 
and Stenning observed in the 1970s and 1980s, marking a ‘second quiet revolution’. The 
paper then explores some of the regulatory questions that arise from these changes, which 
have been largely ignored, to date, by scholars of policing and policy-makers making some 
clear recommendations for the future focus of them.  
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Introduction   
Writing in the late 1970s and early 1980s Shearing and Stenning observed the substantial 
changes to policing taking place at the time in North America, describing the transformation 
                                                          
1 Institute of Criminal Justice Studies,  
University of Portsmouth,  
Portsmouth PO1 2HY, UK.  
Email: mark.button@port.ac.uk  
 
2 
 
as a ‘quiet revolution.’ They noted the substantial growth of private security, linked to the 
advance of mass private property and the under-funding of the police, with a sector focused 
upon preventative, rather than curative policing (Stenning and Shearing, 1979a). They also 
observed how these significant changes had been occurring with little debate or scrutiny 
from scholars and policy-makers. A significant number of researchers have built upon their 
body of research noting the continued augmentation of private security and other forms of 
private policing and the need for special regulatory and governance structures (Stenning and 
Shearing, 1979b; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Prenzler and Sarre, 1999; Loader and White, 
Crawford, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; 2017; Nalla and Gurinskaya, 2017). This 
paper will argue that partly parallel to these changes a ‘second quiet revolution’ has been 
occurring.   
Over the last 20 years there have been other significant changes in society fuelling a further 
transformation in policing. This transformation is linked to the technological revolution 
which has changed many aspects of the way things are done. These include the new cyber-
spaces of play and work, the crimes and transformation of old crimes that technology has 
enabled and the new structures of policing that have emerged to deal with them. The 
combination of these changes this paper will argue has fuelled a ‘new’ private security 
industry, new corporate security structures and a variety of other forms of new private 
policing, largely rooted in voluntarism and vigilantism. These changes, like those of the first 
quiet revolution have occurred with little scholarly debate and consideration of the potential 
policy implications that might be needed as a result of them.  
This paper will begin by outlining the ‘second quiet revolution’ in policing that this paper 
argues is taking place. This will include a consideration of some of the background changes 
to the way people do things and how organisations provide services. It will also illustrate the 
private sector dominance in policing these new domains and an exploration of some of the 
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new corporate security roles and functions that have emerged to fill this gap. The paper will 
argue that a ‘new’ private security industry has emerged alongside the ‘old’. The substantial 
new opportunities for voluntary policing will also be demonstrated. The paper will then 
move on to consider the implications for some of these changes and what issues they might 
raise in terms of potential regulation, using largely the UK. The paper will end with a 
discussion and conclusion bringing together the arguments made in this paper.   
The ‘Second Quiet Revolution’ in Policing  
The background changes  
The way that most people shop, play, bank, date to name some is very different to 20 years 
ago, as is the way many organisations offer services. Central to this transformation has been 
the growth of the internet and the growing ubiquity of devices offering easy access to it. In 
Great Britain in 2006 the number of adults who used the internet daily was 36 percent. This 
had risen to 86 percent in 2018 and in that same year 78 percent of adults used mobile 
smartphones to access the internet (ONS, 2018a). Such changes have been occurring across 
the globe. Central to the growing use of the internet has been its use for social networking, 
shopping, banking and gaming.  
Facebook, for instance, has 1.47 billion daily users and 2.23 billion monthly users (Facebook, 
2018). The users of Facebook communicate with one another, share insights, photos and 
videos to name some. It is also used by corporations, NGOs and political groups to 
campaign and share ideas.  On average a user spends 50 minutes of their day on Facebook 
(New York Times, 2016). In the course of using Facebook and its platforms a wide range of 
crimes and deviant acts can take place from: sexual abuse, uploading illegal images, bullying, 
fraud, the use of offensive language to name some. There are also extensive rules of conduct 
set by Facebook in their terms and conditions that need to be policed.  
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Consider Xbox Live which has over 57 million active players across the world playing video 
games (Statista, 2018a). It has been estimated the average child in the UK aged 12-15 plays 
12.2 hours of video games per week and an 8-11 year old 10 hours (Statista, 2018b). Players 
in the course of gaming have multiple opportunities to commit crimes and engage in deviant 
acts. These range from abusing children, using pirated games, using racially or other 
offensive language, bullying players to simply cheating at games (Gray, 2012). Amazon, 
founded in the mid 1990s, has grown to one of the largest companies in the world with 
global revenues of $177 billion; over 2.4 billion visitors per month to the Amazon website 
(Statista, 2018c). It typifies how the nature of shopping for most has changed from a visit to 
a mall or high street, to an online retailer such as Amazon.  
Crime has also changed as consequence of where people do things (Wall, 2007a). There has 
been a long debate over whether the real rates of crime against individuals are falling (Farrell 
et al 2011). In England and Wales successive data from the Crime Survey for England and 
Wales (CSEW) showed a decline in crime, particularly volume property crimes such as 
burglary and theft. The CSEW had shown a peak in crime of around 20 million crimes in 
1995 with a gradual decline to around 6 million in 2016. However, with the addition of the 
new questions in June 2017 the 5.8 million was doubled to 10.7 million when fraud and 
computer misuse related offences were added, illustrated in figure 1 (ONS, 2018b).  
Figure 1. Estimated crime in England and Wales according the Crime Survey England and 
Wales, year ending December 1981 to year ending September 2018 (thousands) 
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ONS (2018b)  
 
The end of public police dominance  
Debates about the public police and private security have often focused upon the growing 
size of the latter and the growing networks or nodes of which private security form an 
important part (Cunningham et al, 1990; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Dupont, 2006). There 
can be no denying the substantial growth of the ‘old’ private security industry in many 
countries and the eclipsing of the public police in terms of size (see Van Steden and Sarre, 
2007; Small Arms Survey, 2011). However, the public police are still at the centre of this 
policing web (Brodeur, 2010). They are essential to most criminal investigations that go to 
court, are the most important in the vast majority of policing partnerships, are who most 
turn to when serious criminal incidents occur and they often have the best knowledge: in 
terms of intelligence and knowhow. When the highly important act of prevention through 
patrolling is also considered they are also still seen as the key leaders (Wakefield, 2006).  
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In the cyberworld they are much more clearly minor (but important) players (Wall, 2007b). 
Other state bodies outside the police structures have also been created such as the 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) of many countries (FIRST, n.d.). There are 
very few resources dedicated to preventative policing in this sphere by the state police. The 
mirror of the physical world of preventative patrol is virtually non-existent and their 
contribution to policing in terms of investigation hardly scratches the service. Take the 
example of computer misuse offences (hacking, computer viruses, denial of service attacks, 
ransomware etc) in England and Wales. The CSEW estimated in year ending June 2018 
there were 1.1 million offences, of which around 22,000 were recorded by Action Fraud 
(the state reporting agency for fraud and cybercrime offences) (ONS, 2018b). It must also 
be noted the CSEW data excludes organisations who are victims of this crime of which 
there are many thousands too (see, Finnerty et al, 2018). In most years since 2007, 
however, there have been less than 50 prosecutions each year for these offences by the 
state (ONS, 2018c).  Although some of this attrition can be accounted for by other more 
serious offences, such as frauds, becoming the offence that is counted (because of the Home 
Office counting rules), the marginal place of the public police in dealing with this offence is 
starkly illustrated. Also when an organisation suffers a major cyber incident they are more 
likely to turn to specialist consultants to deal with it and any subsequent investigations, such 
as companies such as RSA (see RSA, n.d.).  
New corporate security roles and cyber police 
Organisations have sought to protect themselves from the growing problem of cybercrime 
by developing their own cybersecurity structures and purchasing the services from the ‘new’ 
private security industry to better protect themselves. In most large organisations there are 
cybersecurity structures led by what are generally called chief information security officers 
(CISO) (Karanja, 2016). These run departments of various functions whose role is to 
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prevent and deal with most cybercrimes against the organisation. Rashid et al. (2017, p. 11) 
have identified 19 knowledge areas, from 5 broad categories of cybersecurity. The Tech 
Partnership (2017) estimated there were 58,000 cyber security specialists working in the 
UK and globally Silensec (2017) cite a report that globally there will be 6 million jobs in 
cybersecurity (with a gap of 1.5 million).  
Beneath the CISO a wide range of new specialist cybersecurity roles have emerged. Some of 
the most prominent include: security architects, who design cybersecurity systems; security 
software developers, who develop the software for online security systems; cyber-incident 
responders, who deal with security incidents; security auditors, who check compliance with 
systems; and penetration testers (or ethical hackers), who test systems to see if they can 
hack them. There are many other specialist roles (see Tech Partnership, 2017).   
The growing online space that people use has also led to new forms of private policing to 
deal with the deviance that takes place online. Facebook has created the ‘Community 
Operations Team’ who investigate complaints and moderate the content placed on it (The 
Independent, 2015). Their work is supported by technology via automated tools which 
facilitate both automatic actions and highlight riskier areas for their attention. Microsoft has 
built a system of private policing and justice to police this online community called ‘Xbox 
Live Enforcement’. There is an extensive system of private justice where gamers can have 
their accounts suspended through to outright bans for breaching their terms and conditions. 
Indeed it was revealed in 2009 over one million users had been banned from Xbox Live for 
using pirated games (CNET, 2009).  
One role, however, which deserves slightly more consideration as it is often neglected in 
the cybersecurity literature are the moderators. Like security guards police access and 
behaviours on private space in the physical world, moderators are assuming similar roles 
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online (Wall, 2007b). They also share some common traits such as low pay, high labour 
turnover and having to deal with incidents that lead a psychological toll on them (Vanheule 
et al, 2008; The Business Insider, 2017). The Sunday Times in 2019 reported Facebook had 
increased the number of moderators contracted to it from 4,500 to 15,000 in the previous 
18 months with thousands more used by other tech companies such as YouTube, Google, 
Twitter etc (Bleach, 2019). 
Moderators are employed (or volunteer) to regulate the content which is posted on them. 
This can include removing posts, images and videos containing illegal, disturbing or 
inappropriate content through to less policing roles of facilitation (Wright, 2009). Websites 
use a variety of models including employing their own staff, using specialist companies and 
sourcing volunteers. The nature of the web means than some moderators will be removing 
content from a website based in the USA, with users from the UK and moderators from 
another country, such as the Philippines (New York Times, 2015). There has been very little 
insight or research into their role. An article in the Guardian highlighted the work of one 
moderator policing the discussion forum of the television show, ‘This Morning’, working 
from the comfort of her own home contracted by a company called Emoderation (now 
renamed The Social Element). It illustrated she had tools that highlighted certain keywords 
and could use these to delete inappropriate posts. Content removed could include racist 
comments, through to unacceptable remarks on a presenters’ appearance or those 
appearing on the programme. Some comments may highlight the need for help such as 
suicidal feelings, requiring the moderator to report such posts (The Guardian, 2012).    
There have been other reports on moderators that have illustrated the very difficult job 
they face. Many have suffered having to watch videos from warzones of beheadings, gutting 
of soldiers and child soldiers engaged in killing. Gross acts of cruelty against animals, 
bestiality and very offensive comments are some of the other content they have to observe. 
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There has been critique that many are not adequately supported for the content they have 
to view (Newton, 2019). The consequences of this is that many do not last in the job and 
there is high labour turnover (The Business Insider, 2017).  
The ‘new’ private security industry 
The needs of organisations and individuals to deal with the growing cybersecurity problems 
has spawned a wide range of new companies to offer such services as well as some 
traditional security companies and others moving into this area too. Some of the companies 
that have emerged from the ‘old’ security industry, offering the full range of services include 
G4S, which has a Risk Consulting arm that offers these services. There have been companies 
from other sectors that have moved into this area, such as the traditional consultants. For 
example PWC offers cyber security services amongst all the other extensive services 
offered. BAE Systems has also developed such services coming from a largely defence 
manufacturing background and mainstream IT services providers like IBM. Others are new 
and like the tech giants have grown rapidly, for example Checkpoint Security Technologies, 
Symantec, RSA, Kaspersky to name a few. Like the ‘old’ industry there are large players, 
catering predominantly for big organisations; down to petite companies focussing upon 
smaller firms. There are also many companies operating in niche areas like penetration 
testing, such as companies like Bulletproof (see https://www.bulletproof.co.uk). The supply 
of moderators has also spawned companies such as The Social Element and ( 
https://thesocialelement.agency/ ).  
 
This is a new and expanding sector which is very dynamic as technology evolves and threats 
change. There has been very little research on this sector from a policing perspective, so 
below in Figure 2 is a list of some of the key segments of the ‘new’ private security industry.   
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Figure 2. Activities of the ‘new’ private security industry 
 
 
Outsourced cybersecurity solutions (some organisations completely outsource this 
function to specialist providers) 
 
Design, build and maintenance of security systems (organisations offering services to 
others to do all or some of these functions).  
 
Threat intelligence, analytics, monitoring and moderating (monitoring for emerging threats 
and putting in place measures to deal with such risks as they emerge)  
 
Penetration/vulnerability testing (ethically penetrating systems to check for vulnerabilities) 
 
Phishing awareness (raising awareness of phishing scams) 
 
Incident response (responding to attacks and incidents) 
 
Digital investigation services (conducting investigations relating to digital services) 
 
Disaster recovery (dealing with recovery following major attack) 
 
Data compliance and protection (ensuring systems comply with data regulations and are 
suitably protected) 
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Data (mining and matching) systems for the prevention of crimes (largely fraud)  
 
Cyber security software products (anti-virus, malware detection etc) 
 
Moderating websites  
 
 
 
  
The size of this sector globally is huge and growing. Market reports (which must be 
considered carefully as many do not reveal their methodology and are often predictions) 
show a sector that is beginning to catch up if not eclipse the ‘old’ private security industry. 
Marketsandmarkets (2017) estimated the global cyber security market was worth $137.85 
billion in 2017, predicted to grow to $231.94 billion in 2022 and Allied Market Research 
(2016) estimated the same sector would be worth $198 billion by 2022. These can be 
juxtaposed to reports on the ‘old’ private security industry which have estimated a global 
security market worth US$70.02 billion in 2016 (Grand View Research, 2017) to $244 
billion estimated by  Freedonia (2013).  
 
New openings for voluntary participation in policing  
The technological changes have also fuelled new opportunities for people to voluntarily 
participate in policing (Huey et al, 2012; Chang et al, 2018; Grabosky and Urbas, 
forthcoming). These opportunities span a wide range of potential activities. The internet 
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creates opportunities for open source research such that anyone with the time and skills 
can to engage in desk based investigations. For example in one famous case in the UK a 
woman using Google images was able to show a man who had been presumed dead in a 
canoeing accident, whose wife had claimed the life insurance policy, was clearly a fraudster. 
She did this by finding an estate agent’s brochure online from Panama, with a picture of 
them both after his presumed ‘death’, and then alerting a national newspaper who informed 
the police, who had not yet discovered this (The Telegraph, 2007). There are even websites 
offering those with the time the ability to watch CCTV cameras and report potential 
problems (see https://www.insecam.org/ ). 
Most controversially, however, it has facilitated a new form of vigilantism. The world of 
scams and particularly cyber-frauds has also spawned a variety of more organised online 
vigilante action,  ‘digilantism’ or ‘netilantism’, which is based upon websites and/or official 
groups. Some of these are linked to countries, others are more globally based. One 
prominent website  http://www.419eater.com/ seeks to engage in ‘scambaiting’, which is 
simply engaging with scammers to waste their time.  
The 419eater website is focused upon 419 scams but encourages action against other types 
too. The site provides news on scams and tips on how to waste the scammers’ time. There 
are a variety of other websites which can be found that fit this genre such as 
http://baita.mugu.co.uk/ , http://www.ebolamonkeyman.com/ and 
http://www.romancescambaiter.com/. Another such as http://www.scamorama.com/ with a 
focus more on showcasing the variety and comedy value of some attempted scams, rather 
than baiting them. Youtube also provides a powerful resource for scambaiters too, where 
many examples of scammers placed on this website by some of the websites already noted 
as well as individuals. Some ‘scambaiters’ have not only wasted the time of the scammers 
13 
 
and exposed them, but effectively implemented amusing and shaming punishments on them 
sometimes involving racism (Byrne, 2013).  
 
These types of vigilante action tend to be facilitated online and are open to the global 
(English speaking) community, although there maybe a bias to particular countries. Little 
research has been conducted upon them and the extent and deeper analysis of their 
contribution and effectiveness is in need of further research. Such vigilante action, however, 
is rarely officially supported by the state police and is often viewed negatively.  
 
The most contentious form of internet vigilantism that has emerged are the so-called 
‘paedophile hunters’. Most of these groups pose as children online in chatrooms with the 
aim of exposing the paedophiles in varying ways. The most prominent groups in the UK 
have included: ‘Letzgo Hunting’, ‘Paedophile Hunter’, ‘Daemon Hunter’, ‘Dark Justice’ and 
‘Hunters 24/7’ and it has been estimated there are 75 groups operating in the UK alone, 
described as a ‘cottage industry’ (The Telegraph, 2018b). The groups justify their acts on the 
basis of exposing paedophiles and passing the information they gather to the police (Hill and 
Wall, 2015). The actions of these groups have clearly helped the police and led to the 
exposure of real paedophiles who have subsequently been charged and convicted. For 
instance in 2018 a man was jailed in the UK after engaging in explicit messages with what he 
believed was a 12 year old girl, amongst others. He had actually been targeted by at least 
three groups of paedophile hunters (The Telegraph, 2018a). In 2018 it was also revealed 
that many police forces in England and Wales have used the evidence gathered by such 
groups with 150 persons charged as a result of their evidence in the previous year (BBC 
News, 2018b).  
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However, some groups have live streamed exposures and confrontations have occurred. 
There has been a concern innocent people could be exposed and the humiliation for some 
has led to suicide. In 2014 it was claimed the suicide of one man exposed by the paedophile 
hunter ‘Stinson Hunter’ was attributed to his public exposure (BBC News, 2014). There has 
also been concern on the suitability of some for conducting such ‘justice’, as ‘Stinson 
Hunter’ had been jailed in the past for 10 years for arson (Coventry Telegraph, 2014).  
 
Private policing, private security and regulation  
Policy responses to the growth of private policing have largely been focused upon statutory 
regulation of parts of the ‘old’ private security industry (Loader and White, 2017) with few 
considering wider regulation and governance (Gurinskaya and Nalla, 2018). The body of 
research exploring regulation includes: the case for regulation of the ‘old’ private security 
industry; assessments of existing regulatory structures in countries; comparisons of different 
systems and proposals for model systems (Gimenez-Salinas, 2004; Minnaar, 2005; Nalla and 
Crichlow, 2017; Nalla and Gurinskaya, 2017; De Waard, 1993; Prenzler and Sarre, 1999; 
Button, 2007; Button and Stiernstedt, 2018; Prenzler and Sarre, 2008; White, 2010; Loader 
and White, 2017). Most regulatory systems gravitate around some form of 
licensing/registration of either the companies offering security officers as well as private 
investigators and/or the individual operatives, predominantly based upon a character 
standard and minimum standards of training (to a lesser extent). Common themes in the 
literature are the gaps between the parts of the private security regulated and the broader 
sector, with some of the most common gaps being:  
● The in-house (proprietary) sector (Cunningham et al, 1990; Button, 2007); 
● Security managers and corporate teams (Button, 2011);  
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● Some technical parts of the sector such as intruder alarms (Button, 2008).  
Some of these more longstanding gaps are under-debated. Take the example of security 
managers running the corporate security of large organisations. These functions wield 
considerable power and direct what many of the regulated roles, such as security officers 
and private investigators have to do. Weiss’s (2017) study of corporate security at Ford in 
the early twentieth century is a stark illustration of the immense capability of such 
departments to wield power in and beyond the workplace. Dupont (2006) has also noted 
the extensive networks delivering security of which security managers form important parts. 
Some writers have noted the importance of some of these functions (Nalla and Morash, 
2002). As Lippert et al, (2013, p 206) note:  
Corporate security is less visible, often wields more authority or power and depends 
on higher quality technology and training than contract guard security. Yet… 
corporate security has failed to capture much attention from security and policing 
scholars (Lippert, et al, 2013, p 206).  
Responding to the ‘new’ private security industry and policing 
The rationale for regulating the ‘old’ private security industry has generally been built upon 
removing criminals, raising standards and making the sector more accountable (Palmer and 
Button, 2011, United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, 2014). There have been very few 
scandals in the UK of criminals securing roles in the ‘new’ private security industry and 
some roles, such as penetration testers/ethical hackers, some organisations actually want to 
hire ‘reformed’ past criminal hackers because of their proven skills. Not all ‘new’ private 
security roles require such past experience, however, and the lack of scandals does not 
indicate there isn’t a problem or an issue. There is, however, clearly some evidence of past 
criminals becoming involved in paedophile hunting (see for example Stinson Hunter) and 
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although such voluntary activities are not part of the private security industry, as a broader 
form of private policing that is growing and having a real impact of many people’s lives, 
perhaps there is a debate to be had over the regulation of who can engage in such activities? 
Just because a pilot is flying for herself and not being paid by an airline would not negate the 
need for regulation of such activities.  
To which the next issue of standards is also an important issue. Much of the regulatory 
control aimed at private security is directed at the standards of operatives and to a lesser 
extent companies. The major exceptions are the aviation and maritime sectors where there 
are extensive standards on how security should be undertaken (Button, 2008). The low pay, 
long hours, limited training and not surprising poor quality of many security officers has 
culminated in the case for minimum standards in these areas to address them been 
introduced in many jurisdictions (United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, 2014).  
There is, however, a limited base of evidence of poor standards of the growing number of 
providers and staff operating in the ‘new’ private security sector. There would seem to be 
some evidence of low standards in terms of training, support and pay among moderators 
(Bleach, 2019; Newton, 2019). The regular cyber and data breaches of corporates losing the 
data of their staff and customers may also indicate not all is well, as poor standards might be 
contributing to such breaches (See Finnerty et al, 2018). Much of the ‘new’ private security 
industry is dominated by higher barriers to entry and there is less of a ‘grudge cost’ 
mentality dominating decisions in comparison to some of the ‘old’ private security industry 
(Goold et al, 2010). Indeed such are the barriers to entry in terms of skills there is much 
evidence of a substantial skills gap (Silensec, 2017). The economics of much of the ‘new’ 
private security industry are different, although some sub-segments such as moderators and 
their global supply, may indicate something different. This does not mean there are no 
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problems in the ‘new’ sector. It just means we need to investigate this more to determine if 
there are issues which may require policy solutions.   
The roles and accountability aspect to the regulation debate has not been one of the most 
prominent arguments in the regulation discourse, but it is one of the most important, if not 
the most important. Perhaps the exception to this are private investigators and door 
supervisors, which have attracted more interest in this aspect of the debate (Button, 1998; 
Lister et al, 2001). Primarily this is because of the breaches of privacy and excessive force 
associated with these occupations. Excessive force is not an issue to be concerned with in 
the ‘new’ sector, but privacy and a wide range of others are. The ‘new’ private security 
industry activities and the voluntary contributions to the broader range of private policing 
activities raise a variety of issues that illustrate the need to consider greater controls to 
ensure accountability for some of the decisions that are taken by such operatives and the 
data they have access to.  
Moderators in their role policing what goes online may have access to illegal pornography, 
sensitive information and images that should not be in the public domain to name some. 
Alongside these, even more powerful roles such as CISOs, security architects and 
penetration testers to name some may also warrant the need for licensing as many other 
‘old’ security roles already are.   
There has been huge concern raised by companies operating big data related services in the 
political sphere, such as the activities of some such companies in the election of Donald 
Trump and the UK Brexit referendum (Christl, 2017; House of Commons Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sports Committee, 2018). There is a large industry offering data related services 
to reduce the risk of cyber related financial crime to organisations, among many other areas 
(Button et al, 2016; Christl, 2017). The designation of a person as higher risk in a financial 
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decision can have implications for whether a person secures a loan, mortgage or even keeps 
a bank account and many of these companies operating in this area are making judgements 
about persons on an industrial scale with little public scrutiny of their processes or 
effectiveness.  
For example in one quarter, the company Threatmetrix assessed over 8.3 billion 
transactions for their legitimacy based upon hundreds of attributes. They found over 151 
million attacks and 1.6 billion Bot attacks (Threatmetrix, 2019). Many of the prevented 
attacks will involve the effective designation of the customer as a fraudster, without 
reference to formal criminal justice structures.  There are many other data companies 
offering such services around the world designating individuals and data associated with 
them as potential fraudsters (see, Christl, 2017). Some private entities also have access to 
cyber-tools as potent as the state’s which are used to engage in corporate espionage and 
other acts of damage against competitors (see Maurer, 2018; and Zilber, 2018).    
Designation as a fraudster based upon false or inadequate decisions might be bad, but pales 
in significance to been outed as a paedophile. The activities of the online hunters – despite 
the condemnation of the police have been used extensively. The instant justice and shaming 
by some groups have led to serious harm and even suicides by some they have exposed. As 
already noted there is evidence of unsuitable persons operating in such groups, with some 
with convictions for violence or criminal motives. For example, the Times newspaper 
recently exposed gangs of criminals using such groups as means to rob and blackmail 
paedophiles (Hamilton, 2019). The primary motives of some ‘hunters’ might seem more 
directed towards feeding their desire for violence against one of the most despised groups 
in society, rather than dealing with the problem.  The implications for someone wrongly 
publicly outed as a paedophile could be huge. There clearly is a role for some activities in 
this area, but the restriction and regulation of this would seem to be one of the more 
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obvious area of intervention. Some scambaiters have been implicated as engaging in racist 
practices (Byrne, 2013). These all suggest the need for more controls to be investigated for 
these activities.   
Discussion and Conclusion  
This paper has illustrated the significant changes in private policing that have occurred in 
response to the major technological transformations that have transpired over the last 20 
years. The paper argues these constitute a ‘second quiet revolution’ with the emergence of 
a wide variety of new forms of private policing, some of which constitute a ‘new’ private 
security that has emerged, along with other private policing, largely parallel to the ‘old’ 
private security industry and private policing. Like the first quiet revolution these changes 
have occurred with little scrutiny and public debate.  
The regulation of anything related to the internet and involving cross-border activities poses 
significant challenges (Johnson and Post, 1995; Laidlaw, 2015). This is not a reason to decline 
to consider the issue. There is already evidence that some of the activities associated with 
the ‘second quiet revolution’ in private policing deserve to be considered to be regulated. 
There is in most countries extensive regulation of data processing, but this does not cover 
all of the activities of the ‘new’ private security industry and rarely creates deep licensing 
systems for personnel. There is clearly a regulatory gap when the ‘new’ private security 
industry is considered, but much more research needs to be undertaken to fill that gap with 
ideas. A priority for policy-makers must be more depth and focused consideration of these 
new activities to assess if current regulatory and governance mechanisms work and whether 
new structures should be created to deal with them. As Stenning and Shearing (1979b, p. 
263) have argued in relation to the ‘old’ private security industry:  
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If private security personnel are in reality no different from ordinary citizens, a law 
which treats them alike seems most appropriate. But if in reality they are not, and 
the law still treats them as they are, it becomes inappropriate… 
This paper has shown there are many new roles and services that have emerged that are 
many steps away from that of what an ordinary citizen or firm engages in. It is time for 
researchers to start better understanding these new forms of private policing. And where 
the evidence supports it, develop new policy ideas for the better regulation of these 
growing and increasingly important activities. The priorities for researchers and policy-
makers to fill this gap should be:  
 To map the activities and extent of the new private security and private policing;  
 To identify areas of concern which require regulatory and other governance 
responses, with particular reference to new roles that may require licensing;  
 To explore the adequacy of existing regulatory and governance structures to 
undertake such functions where necessary; and  
 To identify new models of regulation and governance where existing structures are 
not deemed appropriate.    
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